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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE DEATH OF DR. HUGO SPADAFORA: HUMAN




Dr. Hugo Spadafora Franco, a prominent Panamanian political
leader,' was brutally tortured and slain in September of 1985.2 Wit-
nesses last saw him alive in the custody of Panamanian Defense Force
(PDF) guards, 3 but Spadafora's decapitated body was discovered in
* J.D., 1989, Washington College of Law, The American University.
I. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 175, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doe. 10 rev. 1
(1988); Supplemental Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Violations of the Human Rights of Hugo Spadafora by the Republic of Panama, Case
9726, INrER-AM. C.H.R. 11 (Sept. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Supplemental Petition].
Hugo Spadafora, a citizen of Panama, was a medical doctor who served as director of
the Integrated Health System and later as Vice-Minister of Health until 1978 under
the military government of General Omar Torrijos, then head of state in Panama. Id.
at 11-12. From 1980 until the time of his death, Spadafora made public accusations
against General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the current de facto head of state in Pan-
ama, charging him with corruption, drug trafficking, and other illegal activities. Id. at
12; Ejecutan a Spadafora (Spadafora Executed), La Prensa (Panama), Sept. 17, 1985,
at 1.
2. Case 9726, INTER-AMi. C.H.R. 174, 176, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.74, doe. 10 rev. 1
(1988); DEP'T. OF ST., 99TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT TO THE HousE Comm.:. ON FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 640 (Comm. Print
1986) [hereinafter ST. DEP'T REP.]; Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 29;
Ejecutan a Spadafora, supra note 1, at 1; En Pocas Palabras (In a Few Words), La
Prensa, Sept. 17, 1985. A farmer found Spadafora's decapitated body in Costa Rica on
September 14, 1985. Id.
3. ST. DEP'T REP., supra note 2, at 640. The Panamanian Defense Force (PDF),
previously called the National Guard, is the military force that runs Panama despite
the appearance of a civilian government. Id.; Human Rights and Political Develop-
ments in Panama: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International
Organizations of the House of Representatives, and the Subcomm. on Western Hemi-
sphere Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1986)
[hereinafter Human Rights Subcomm.] (statement of Jack Hood Vaughn, former
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Costa Rica.4 The governments of both Costa Rica and Panama investi-
gated, but with ambiguous results.5 Dissatisfied with the investigation
of the Panamanian government, Winston Spadafora presented the case
to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission) on
behalf of his brother.'
The case of Dr. Spadafora brings to light the problem of investiga-
tive responsibility of states involved in individual torture cases. The
Commission, an organ of the Organization of American States
(OAS),' promotes the respect for and defense of human rights as its
United States Ambassador to the Republic of Panama). Vaughn characterizes the PDF
as "teflon troops" that are gaining greater influence while becoming more corrupt. Id.
at 8; see Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 6 (describing the victory of the PDF
candidate in the 1984 presidential election, even though early returns indicated a vic-
tory for the opposition); Hersh, Panama General Reported to Rig Election in 1984,
N.Y. Times, June 22, 1986, at 1 [hereinafter Panama General Reported to Rig Elec-
tion] (describing PDF intervention in the 1984 presidential elections).
4. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 29; "Melo" Spadafora acusa a Noriega
y Ow Young ("Melo" Spadafora accuses Noriega and Ow Young), La Prensa, Sept.
17, 1985, at 1; En Pocas Palabras, supra note 2; Ejecutan a Spadafora, supra note 1,
at 1.
5. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 176-81, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doe. 10 rev.
1 (1988); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 30-36. The Costa Rican Public Min-
istry investigation concluded that Spadafora died in Panama. Id. at 31. Further investi-
gation was therefore limited. Id. The Panamanian government investigation was not
free from PDF influence. Id. at 36.
6. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 174, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.74, doe. 10 rev. 1
(1988); Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 110, 110 OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doe. 9 rev. 1
(1987); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 1.
7. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at
1, OEA/ser. L./V/II.23, doe. rev. 6, 1, O.A.S.O.R. OEA/ser. K./XVI/I.1, doe. 65
rev. 1 corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), also reprinted in BASIC Docu-
MENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 25, OEA/ser.
L./V/II.71, doe. 6 rev. 1 (1987) [hereinafter American Convention]. Article 33 of the
American Convention establishes the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as
a competent organ of the Organization of American States. Id. art. 33. Articles 34
through 40 describe the organization of the Commission. Id. arts. 34-40. Articles 41
through 43 describe the functions of the Commission. Id. arts. 41-43. Articles 44
through 47 describe competence, or those parties able to present a petition to the Com-
mission. Id. arts. 44-47. Finally, articles 48 through 51 describe the procedures that the
Commission follows. Id. arts. 48-51; Charter of the Organization of American States,
Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2416, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, protocol of Amend.
Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. Article 51
of the Protocol of Buenos Aires of 1967 amended the OAS Charter to include the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission) as an organ of the OAS.
Id. The amendment took effect in 1970. Id.
8. OAS Charter, supra note 7. The Organization of American States, established
in 1948, is a regional international organization created to achieve peace and solidarity,
as well as maintain sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence within the re-
gion of the American States. BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 1-2, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doe. 6 rev. 1 (1987). States
that have ratified the OAS Charter are as follows: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
The Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Doml-
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primary function.9 Responsibilities include investigation of claims alleg-
ing violations of the American Convention on Human Rights"0 and the
American Declaration of Human Rights"1 brought before the Commis-
sion.12 When states fail to respond to informational inquiries, or per-
form inadequate investigations, they fail to fulfill their international re-
sponsibility under customary international law.13 In the Spadafora
nica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, M6xico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Perf, Saint Christopher
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago, the United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. at inside back
cover.
9. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 41. The functions of the Commission
are to nurture an awareness of human rights, to assist countries to frame domestic law
and practice in favor of human rights, to study and investigate human rights issues and
practices, to respond to and advise courses of action pursuant to requests and petitions,
and to submit annual reports to the Organization of American States. Id.; American
Convention on Human Rights (summary) in BASIC DocubIENTS PERTAINING TO
HUMaAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 10-11, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71. doe. 6
rev. 1 (1987) [hereinafter American Convention (summary)].
The American Convention establishes obligations of states parties to protect the
rights and freedoms defined. Id. Concentration is on civil and political rights; economic,
social, and cultural rights are protected to the extent of the rights implicit in the OAS
Charter. Id. Part II of the Convention establishes the OAS organs designed to protect
the rights, such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. Id.; see also American Declaration, infra note I 1
(enumerating the civil and political rights declared fundamental in the American
States).
10. American Convention, supra note 7, at 27; American Convention (summary),
supra note 9, at 11; INTER-AMERICAN COMINISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: TEN YEARS OF
AcTivTEs, 1971-1981, 7-8 (1982) [hereinafter IACHR: TEN YEARs]. The OAS views
the adoption of the American Convention in 1969, and implementation in 1978, as a
strengthening of the OAS commitment to promote human rights and responsibilities in
the Americas. American Convention (summary), supra note 9, at 11. Signatory coun-
tries to the American Convention are as follows: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Gua-
temala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, M6xico, Nicaragua, Panamdi, Paraguay, Penr, Suri-
name United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. American Convention, supra note 7, at
63. Chile, Paraguay, and the United States have not ratified the American Convention.
Id.
11. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 2, 1948,
by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotd, Colombia, re-
printed in BAsic DocUMENTs PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERI-
CAN SYSTEM 17, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71. doe. 6 rev. 1 (1987) [hereinafter American
Declaration]; IACHR: TEN YEARS, supra note 10, at 5. The American Declaration is
an OAS document which includes a preamble and thirty-eight articles that define the
rights and duties of man that are attributes of human personality. Id.
12. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 41(f); see also supra note 9 and ac-
companying text (noting the power of the Commission, through article 41, to take ac-
tion on petitions pursuant to American Convention articles 44 through 51).
13. Sepfdlveda, El Panorama de los Derechos Humanos en la America Latina. Ac-
tualidad y Perspeetiva (Panorama of Human Rights in Latin America: Actuality and
Perspective), 45 BOLETfIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 1053, 1054 (1982). In
terms of customary international law and the international declarations and conven-
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case, the Panamanian government interpreted its constitution in such a
way as to avoid a thorough investigation into the death. 4 This raises
two issues. First, does this interpretation alleviate Panama from any
further responsibility? Second, under these circumstances, does the
Costa Rican government have the obligation to reopen its
investigation?
Part I of this Comment describes the procedure for presenting cases
to the Commission, with reference to the presentation of individual pe-
titions, the investigative procedures in use, the current expectation of
state responsibility, and the limitations inherent in the doctrine of state
responsibility. Part II discusses past problems with the failure of differ-
ent states to adequately investigate violations of human rights under
Commission norms, centering on the previous investigations in Panama.
Part III discusses the specifics of Commission Case 9726 of Hugo
Spadafora. Part IV analyzes the problem of investigative responsibility
that the Spadafora case presents. Part V presents recommendations for
setting an international standard of investigative responsibility through
an interpretation of articles 24,15 48(1),16 and 5017 of the American
tions that exist and are developing, the state involved in a possible human rights viola-
tion has the responsibility to thoroughly investigate the case. Id.; Vassilenko, Function-
ing of International Law and International Sanctions, 24 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 77, 80
(1984).
14. ST. DEP'T. REP., supra note 2, at 641. President Eric del Valle claimed that the
Panamanian constitution did not empower him with the independent authority to ap-
point an investigative body. Id.; Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 34.
15. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 24. Article 24 states that all persons
are equal before the law and are thus entitled to equal protection of the law without
discrimination. Id.; IACHR: TEN YEARS, supra note 10, at 320. The Commission
states that the accused has the right to full protection, independent counsel, and due
process. Id.
16. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(1). Article 48(1) instructs a course
of action for the Commission when it receives a petition or communication alleging
violation of any protected right. Id.
Article 44 of the Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
restates the authority given to the IACHR to perform on-site visits. Regulations of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, approved Apr. 8, 1980, amended Mar.
7, 1985, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE IN-
TER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 75, 90-91 OEA/ser. L./V/II.71. doc. 6 rev. 1 (1987) [herein-
after IACHR Regulations]; see also Norris, Observations In Loco: Practice and Proce-
dure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 46, 48-
95 (1980) [hereinafter Norris, In Loco] (describing the background, implementation,
and the growing importance of the observation in loco, or on-site visit).
17. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 50. Article 50 directs the Commission
to report to the concerned states its findings, conclusions, proposals, and recommenda-
tions, along with the party's statements and separate opinions. Id. The states, however,
are not permitted to publish the transmittal. Id.; see also IACHR: TEN YEARS, supra
note 10, at 338 (observing that the IACHR doctrine on state responsibility mandates
state recognition of the fundamental duty to protect human rights).
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Convention that can be supported through an advisory opinion 8 of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.1"
I. PROCEDURE FOR PRESENTING A CASE TO THE
COMMISSION
A. THE INDIVIDUAL PETITION PROCEDURE
An individual petition brought before the Commission is subject to
the procedure described in articles 44 through 47 of the American
Convention. The procedure contains liberal standing restrictions,21
and petitions can refer to individual violations or those that are general
or collective in nature.22 Petitioners must exhaust all domestic re-
18. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 64. Article 64 gives the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights the authority to issue advisory opinions regarding the in-
terpretation of the American Convention and other applicable treaties addressing the
protection of human rights. Id.; see generally Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of
the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 Mi. J. INT'L L. 1 (1985) [hereinafter
Buergenthal, Advisory Practice] (discussing the Inter-American Court procedure for
issuing advisory opinions).
19. See American Convention, supra note 7, arts. 52-69 (the framework of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and noting its establishment with the ratifica-
tion of the American Convention).
20. American Convention, supra note 7, arts. 44-47. Article 44 addresses proper
petitioners before the Commission. Id. art. 44. Article 45 examines the issue of stand-
ing. Id. art. 45. Article 46 specifies requirements pertaining to prior exhaustion of rem-
edies, statute of limitations, finality of collateral proceedings, and information con-
tained on the petition. Id. art. 46. It also recognizes exceptions if remedies or due
process do not exist under domestic law. Id. Article 47 renders any incomplete, ground-
less, or previously addressed petition inadmissible. Id. art. 47; see Norris, The Indivi-
dual Petition Procedure of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human
Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUbiAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 108, 108-16 (H. Han-
num ed. 1986) [hereinafter Norris, Individual Procedure] (explaining in detail the in-
dividual petition procedure outlined in articles 44 through 51 of the American
Convention).
21. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 44. Any person, group of persons, or
nongovernmental organization that at least one member state of the OAS legally recog-
nizes can present a petition to the IACHR. Id. The petition must contain either a
denunciation or a complaint of the convention by a state party. Id.; Norris, Individual
Procedure, supra note 20, at 112.
22. Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20, at 112. Collective petitions refer
to multiple victims and violations supported by cases with certain common elements
that enable them to be treated as collective rather than several individual cases. Id.
General petitions allege widespread or general disrespect for human rights not limited
to a particular group or to a single fact situation. Id.; see, e.g., Case 9265, INTER-At.
C.H.R. 113, 113, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doe. 10 rev. 1 (1985) (treating eleven cases of
reported human rights violations in Suriname as collective in nature because those ar-
rested were allegedly involved in a plot to overthrow the government); IACHR: TEN
YEARS, supra note 10, at 237-41 (describing case 4425 in which labor union leaders
allegedly were killed or kidnapped for trying to organize Coca-Cola Company workers
in Guatemala); Cases 1702, 1748, and 1755, INTER-AMI. C.H.R. OEA/ser. L./V/II.32,
doc. 21 rev. 1 (1974), reprinted in IACHR: TEN YEARs, supra note 10, at 128-34
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medies, before the Commission will admit the petition. The technical
requirements of the procedure include the identification of the peti-
tioner,"' a statement of facts,25 a timely filing within six months of the
final ruling of the domestic court,26 and that the case is not pending in
any other intergovernmental organization or tribunal. 7
(demonstrating the Commission's consideration of three cases from Guatemala as a
general petition because of alleged general arbitrary arrests and deaths); Cases 1758,
1759, 1762, and 1763, INTER-AM. C.H.R. OEA/ser. L./V/II.31, doc. 42 rev. 1 (1973),
reprinted in IACHR: TEN YEARS, supra note 10, at 140-41 (demonstrating a general
petition for alleged lack of due process and arbitrary arrest violations in Paraguay).
23. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 46(l)(a); IACHR Regulations, supra
note 16, art. 37; Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20, at 113-14. The petitioner
is required to seek all available domestic remedies, including appeals, before presenting
a case to the IACHR. IACHR Regulations, supra note 16, art. 37; but see American
Convention, supra note 7, art. 46(2) (listing exceptions to the requirement to exhaust
domestic remedies before admitting a case); IACHR Regulations, supra note 16, art.
37 (placing the burden upon the accused government to prove that local remedies re-
main available unless evident from previously provided background information that
the petitioner alleges an inability to exhaust domestic remedies because of the lack of
due process in domestic legislation, denial of access to the courts, or an unwarranted
delay in the rendering of a final judgment); Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note
20, at 116 (outlining the exception if another organization to which the petition has
been submitted is limited to a general examination and if no specific decision of the
facts submitted to the Commission is made or would settle the situation in question).
24. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 46(l)(d); The petitioner must include
his or her name, nationality, profession, domicile, and signature. Id. If the petition is
made on behalf of the victim, the Commission may require a notarized power of
attorney or other proof of authorization. Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20,
at 114.
25. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 44. The statement of facts must in-
clude the date and place of the alleged violation, a complete detailed account of the
violation, and the connection between the government and the violation. Norris, Indi-
vidual Procedure, supra note 20, at 114-15. If the accusation is against private per-
sons, the Commission can only examine the case if they were acting under the author-
ity of the state. Id.
26. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 46(1)(b). But see Norris, Individual
Procedure, supra note 20, at 115 (delineating the exceptions provided in cases when
victims are unable to file due to imprisonment without freedom of communication, in-
firmity while imprisoned, or endangerment of life should they file); IACHR Regula-
tions, supra note 16, art. 38 (stating that the Commission will review the circumstances
of each individual case to determine filing requirements).
27. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 46(1)(c). The Commission will not
hear a case if it is pending in another international governmental organization or if it
duplicates a petition pending before the Commission or one that already was decided.
IACHR Regulations, supra note 16, art. 39(1). But see id. art. 39(2) (stating that the
IACHR will consider a case if the other governmental organization made no specific
decision on the facts of the case, or if the petitioner in the other proceeding is a third
party without the authorization of the victim or a family member to present the peti-
tion); Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20, at 116 (stipulating the circum-




Once the Commission deems the petition admissible, 8 it opens the
case and transmits the pertinent information to the government ac-
cused of the human rights violation.29 Unless the government requests a
justifiable delay of no more than sixty days, the Commission expects a
reply within 120 days of the date that the information was sent. 0 The
Commission will communicate with the government through the most
direct means when it is believed that an imminent threat or danger to a
person's life or physical integrity exists." If the government fails to
respond, consideration of the petition continues according to the normal
procedure, and the government is now on notice that the Commission
has the case under examination. 2
The Commission may presume the allegations are true if the govern-
ment fails to respond to the information or produce evidence disproving
them. 33 When the Commission receives the government's response, the
28. See Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20, at 116-17 (noting that the
admissibility procedure is informal). A staff attorney determines whether the petition
meets the prima facie requirements of admissibility. Id. at 117. If the petition is not
complete, the attorney may ask the petitioner for more information. Id. Unless the
Secretariat of the OAS or the concerned government raises objections, the Commission
does not make formal decisions on admissibility, but rather proceeds to the merits of
the case. Id.; see also Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 110, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doe. 9
rev. 1 (1987) (describing the procedure and correspondence through which the IACHR
declared admissible the petition of Winston Spadafora, acting on behalf of his brother,
Hugo).
29. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(l)(a). To help safeguard the peti-
tioner, the IACHR staff attorney edits the information in the complaint and supplies
the government with the relevant facts without identifying the author of the petition.
Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20, at 117.
30. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 51(1); Norris, Individual Procedure,
supra note 20, at 118.
31. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(2). A telephone call and telegram
or detailed cablegram are employed as faster means of communication than the mail
system to save the victim from a potential life-threatening situation. Norris, Individual
Procedure, supra note 20, at 119.
32. Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20, at 119. Even if the government
does not respond to the telephone call or cablegram sent by the Commission, by putting
the government on notice that the IACHR is investigating the situation may save the
victim from immediate danger. Id.
33. IACHR Regulations, supra note 16, art. 42. Article 42 states that transmittals
to a government are regarded as true if the government fails to respond with pertinent
information or other evidence. Id. The Commission jurisprudence addresses state re-
sponsibility by declaring that a presumption forms that the government is responsible if
the arrests are not reported immediately, if those arrested are taken to unofficial places,
and the military or paramilitary groups conduct the operations and interrogations. Re-
port on the Situation of Human Rights in Bolivia 38, OEA/ser. L./V/II.53, doe. 6
(1981); see, e.g., Case 9437, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 43, 44, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doe. 10
rev. 1 (1985) (citing the failure of the government of Chile to respond under article 42
as one consideration in finding against the government); Case 9472, INTER-AM. C.H.R.
1989]
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petitioner may reply to it."' This process of reply and rejoinder contin-
ues as long as necessary to establish the facts of the case. 5 Hearings
are another way to gather information about cases before the Commis-
sion.3 6 The Commission may request a hearing at any time. Either
party may present oral or written statements, but the hearing is not
necessarily adversarial in nature.38
A final way for the Commission to investigate is in loco,3s or on-site
visit, which is used for investigating an individual case or for studying
the general condition of human rights in a member state.40 Unlike non-
signatories, parties to the Convention are obligated to provide the nec-
essary facilities for the investigation.41 The ability to make on-site visits
has developed through precedent and statutory interpretation of article
48 of the American Convention.42 The Commission started to make
these visits in 196 1,43 with a view to investigating the then existing
human rights conditions in the Dominican Republic. The OAS member
states now accept this practice, and its importance to member states
has also grown."
46, 47, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985) (citing the government of Chile's
failure to respond under article 42 as a negative factor while finding the government in
violation); Case 6724, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 79, 81, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1985) (recognizing that the government of El Salvador's failure to respond under arti-
cle 42 affected the holding against the government).
34. Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20, at 118.
35. Id.
36. IACHR Regulations, supra note 16, art. 43; Norris, Individual Procedure,
supra note 20, at 119. The Commission may request a hearing if it perceives a need for
pertinent written or oral information. IACHR Regulations, supra note 16, art. 43.
37. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(1)(e).
38. Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20, at 118.
39. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(1)(d); Norris, Individual Proce-
dure, supra note 20, at 119. The original mandate of the IACHR did not give specific
authority for conducting on-site visits. Norris, In Loco, supra note 16, at 48. This
power was not expressly prohibited; thus, its competence was developed through statu-
tory interpretation and precedent. Id. at 49.
40. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(l)(d); Norris, Individual Proce-
dure, supra note 20, at 119; see Norris, In Loco, supra note 16, at 76 (acknowledging
that the request to study the human rights situation of a country may come through an
invitation from the state, from a third party such as a complainant or member state, or
from an absolute majority vote of the Commission requesting permission).
41. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(l)(d); Norris, Individual Proce-
dure, supra note 20, at 119.
42. See Norris, In Loco, supra note 16, at 49 (describing the progress and develop-
ment of the on-site visit through a chronology of visits made from 1961 through 1979).
43. Id. at 50. The visit of the Commission to the Dominican Republic expanded its
activities beyond receiving testimony to visiting high officials, traveling the interior of
the country, and visiting the sites of alleged violations. Id.
44. Id. at 47 (enunciating events of the June 1977 General Assembly of the OAS,
when the United States revitalized the on-site visit through support of an increased
budget for the IACHR and giving permission for free access to the United States terri-
[VOL. 4:377
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C. STATE AND INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
The Commission views the state as responsible to guarantee the
safety of its inhabitants.45 Under the theory of state responsibility, the
duty to guarantee safety extends to aliens within a state.4' According to
the Commission, the state should do everything possible to effectively
protect human rights of both aliens and its nationals.'7 A state can fail
in its duty through action, condonation of an illegal practice,'s or omis-
sion or failure to stop an administrative practice that violates human
rights.
49
tory for visits when deemed necessary); see also Statute of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, approved Oct. 1979, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PER-
TAINING TO HUMiAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN Sys-rs, 64, 70, OEA/ser. L./
V/II.71, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1987) (giving the text of article 18 of the statute that broadens
the powers of the Commission to include on-site visits to investigate human rights situ-
ations in member states).
45. IACHR: TEN YEARS, supra note 10, at 338. The statement of the IACHR
concerning state responsibility provides:
One source of concern to the Commission is the concept that the government will
be responsible only for violations attributable to their officials or agents and
could sit back and do nothing in the face of the threats to these rights that result
from the armed conflict between enemy groups. The duty of the state is to
guarantee the safety of its inhabitants, and it can fail in its duty both by action
and by omission. The state cannot disqualify itself on so fundamental a matter
and should do everything possible to effectively protect these rights.
Id.
46. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S.
19, art. 9; U.N. CHARTER arts. 55- 56; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200A, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. State responsibility to injured aliens, if the act
or omission is attributable to the state, is a norm codified in a number of international
treaties. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
47. IACHR: TEN YEARS, supra note 10, at 338; American Convention, supra note
7, art. 1. Article 1 of the American Convention describes the obligations of the parties
with respect to the rights and freedoms of people within the state's jurisdiction. Id.
Article 2.3 declares that state parties should ensure effective remedies for violations of
an individual's rights and freedoms. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
46, art. 2.3.
48. See Case 4326, INTER-M . C.H.R. 23, OEA/ser. L./V/11.57, doe. 6 rev. 1
(1982) (describing the efforts of a father trying to discover the fate of his daughter,
who disappeared while in the custody of Argentine authorities); Case 9265, INTER-A!,!.
C.H.R. 113, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doe. 10 rev. 1 (1985) (describing the complaints of
widespread human rights violations in Suriname).
49. Greek Case, 12 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 194 (1969). The European Commission on
Human Rights defined administrative practice as the official tolerance of the repetition
of acts which are incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Id.;
see Case 4573, INTER-M . C.H.R. 52, OEA/ser. L./V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982)
(resolving a case in which Chilean military police tortured a victim who subsequently
died); Case 7473, INTER-Mi. C.H.R. 34, OEA/ser. L./V/II.57, doec. 6 rev. 1 (1982)
(outlining a case in which a Bolivian lawyer was subject to arbitrary detention and
torture); Case 6724, INTER-Mi. C.H.R. 79, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doec. 10 rev. I
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Alien's rights are protected under state responsibility norms,"0 but
those of the state's nationals are considered a domestic matter. 1 The
idea of extending state responsibility expectations to all human rights
investigations conducted by the state is in the development stage. 2 The
Minnesota Protoco 5 3 is a draft of procedures to implement such an
idea in the area of extra-legal, arbitrary, and summary executions.
54
Recommendations are consistent with the Second Draft of the Princi-
ples on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbi-
trary and Summary Executions.5 5 The recommendations could apply in
a regional system such as the OAS that already has a human rights
declaration and convention. 6
(1985) (describing a case in which Salvadoran army members kidnapped civilians who
were later found dead).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 164 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Restatement § 164(1) declares that a state
is responsible under international law for injury to an alien caused by conduct subject
to its jurisdiction if the conduct is both attributable to the state and wrongful under
international law. Id.
51. Id. § 165. Both the International Law Commission and the United Nations
Charter provide for the protection of human rights. Id.
52. MINNESOTA LAWYERS INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, REPORT
OF THE MINNESOTA CONFERENCE: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH ADEQUATE
INQUIRY PROCEDURES (Oct. 21-23, 1987) 1 [hereinafter MINNESOTA CONF. REP.]. The
Minnesota Conference was held to discuss and draft possible ways to give meaning to
article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id. Article 6 pro-
vides for the right to life and freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life. Id. The Con-
ference participants were challenged to develop impartial internationally recognizable
standards for judging investigations of suspicious deaths. Id.; see Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 46, art. 6 (stating that everyone has the right to life and
forbidding arbitrary deprivations of life).
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishes the Human Rights Commit-
tee of the United Nations. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 46, art.
6. This Committee considers reports submitted by state parties under article 40. Id.
The Committee also receives and considers individual claims of violations by states if
the state is a party to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, 1012 (1986).
53. MINNESOTA CONF. REP., supra note 52, at 5. The full name given to the draft
principles developed and revised by the conference participants is Minnesota Protocol:
Preventing Arbitrary Killing through an Adequate Death Investigation and Autopsy.
Id.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 1.
56. See supra notes 7 and 9 and accompanying text (describing the contents of the
American Convention and the American Declaration).
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II. PAST INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS
A. CASES REVEALING A STATE'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY
INVESTIGATE
States often fail to investigate alleged violations despite direct Com-
mission inquiries.57 The governments may either fail to respond to the
inquiry, or may provide very little information. 8 For example, the gov-
ernment of Chile failed to respond to the Commission in Case 45730 in
which a man died from injuries inflicted while in the custody of the
Chilean military police."0 In Case 7473,61 the Bolivian government
failed to respond to two separate Commission requests for information
about an alleged arbitrary arrest and torture.6 2 The Commission al-
lowed the government of El Salvador four years to answer information
requests in Case 6724,63 that involved military detainees, but received
no response. Failure to respond was one of the bases for the decision
57. See Case 4573, INrER-AM. C.H.R. 52, 55, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.57, doe. 6 rev. 1
(1982) (noting the failure of the Chilean government to answer IACHR inquiries into
a torture case); Case 7473, INTrER-AM. C.H.R. 34, 35, OEA/ser. L./V/II.57, doe. 6
rev. 1 (1982) (describing a Bolivian case in which the government failed to answer
IACHR inquiries about the arbitrary detention of a lawyer).
58. See, e.g., Case 4326, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 23, 23-25, OEA/ser. L./V/II.57, doe.
6 rev. 1 (1982) (raising the inconsistencies in information supplied to the IACHR by
the Argentine government and the petitioner); Case 7951, INTER-A . C.H.R. 84, 101-
04, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doe. 10 rev. 1 (1985) (assessing conflicting information that
the government of Honduras provided to the IACHR); Case 9265, INTER-At. C.H.R.
113, 121, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doe. 10 rev. 1 (1985) (criticizing the inadequacy of
the investigation by the Suriname government into allegations of widespread human
rights abuses).
59. Case 4573, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 52, OEA/ser. L./V/II.57, doe. 6 rev. 1 (1982).
60. Id. Chilean military police held a Chilean professor, Federico Alvarez San-
tibafiez, incommunicado for six days at the National Investigations Center. Id. at 53.
Afterwards, security personnel took him to the penitentiary infirmary where he died.
Id. His medical report indicated that he died because of torture and severe beating. Id.
at 54. The civilian investigator that looked into the matter reported that those involved
in the investigation were affiliated with the military and therefore could not take the
case further. Id. at 53.
The Commission received a petition inquiring into the case on September 24, 1979.
Id. at 52. The IACHR requested information from the Chilean government on October
16, 1979, and again on August 10, 1980. Id. at 53-54. The Government of Chile failed
to respond both times, and a report of the case was eventually published by the Com-
mission. Id. at 52-55.
61. Case 7473, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 34, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.57, doe. 6 rev. 1 (1982).
62. Id. A Bolivian attorney, Flaviano Unzueta, was arbitrarily detained and tor-
tured by Bolivian authorities. Id. at 34. The Commission learned of the case on August
14, 1980. Id. In an attempt to confirm the facts, the IACHR sent requests for informa-
tion on both August 19, 1980 and December 16, 1980. Id. at 35. No reply from the
Bolivian government came to either request, and the Commission found that the Boliv-
ian government's actions violated Mr. Unzueta's human rights. Id.
63. Case 6724, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 79, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doe. 10 rev. 1 (1984).
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
against the government.6
In other instances, states have conducted inadequate or unreliable
investigations. Authorities of the Argentine government detained a sus-
pected anti-government activist in Case 4326. 5 After her arrest, the
government provided no further information to her family despite ef-
forts to locate her.66 Although the Commission received an initial re-
sponse from the government,67 subsequent Commission inquiries sub-
mitted to the Argentine government for more complete information
went unanswered.68 In Case 7951,69 filed against the government of
Honduras, two Costa Rican nationals disappeared while traveling
through Central America. The first reports submitted by the govern-
ments of the states named on the travel itinerary indicated that the
Costa Ricans left Nicaragua,7 I but did not enter Honduras. 1 Subse-
quent correspondence reported that they entered Honduras, but imme-
diately left for Guatemala and traveled on to El Salvador.7 2 The Com-
64. Id. The Salvadoran Armed Forces took three civilian citizens of El Salvador
into custody after a military invasion of a village. Id. at 79-80. Their dead bodies were
discovered shortly thereafter. Id. On March 6, 1980, the Commission received the com-
plaint, and contacted the Government of El Salvador on March 31, 1980 to request
more information. Id. The Commission made subsequent requests on May 31, 1983,
December 5, 1983, and on June 20, 1984. Id. The government of El Salvador did not
respond to any of the requests, and the Commission subsequently made a resolution
against the government. Id.
65. Case 4326, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 23, OEA/ser. L./V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1980).
Naval forces in Buenos Aires, Argentina, detained In6s Ollero, a young worker and
biology student, on July 19, 1977. Id. at 25. Her father notified the Commission of his
complaint on April 28, 1979. Id. at 23.
66. Id. at 26. The authorities originally denied that there was a detention, even
though the arrest was on a police precinct record. Id. at 23. On October 9, 1980, the
Commission sent a request for information to the Argentine government. Id. The gov-
ernment reply indicated that she was previously detained, but was no longer in custody.
Id. at 24.
67. Id. at 31. The government reply suggested that the student was in hiding be-
cause of her suspected militant anti-government activities. Id. at 33. It also stated that
her father had not exhausted his domestic remedies in the Argentine judicial system.
Id. at 32.
68. Id. at 25. No further communication was received from Argentine officials de-
spite a request by the Commission on December 11, 1980. Id.
69. Case 7951, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 84, OEA/ser. L./V/Il.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985).
Two Costa Rican nationals disappeared in Honduras on December 11, 1981, while on a
trip to Mexico. Id. The Commission received the complaint on January 14, 1982. Id.
70. Id. at 88. Nicaraguan border officials had record of them leaving Nicaragua.
Id.
71. Id. at 91. The report from the Honduran government said no record existed
indicating that the two entered Honduras. Id.
72. Id. at 101. The report from Guatemala stated that no record of an entry into
Guatemala existed. Id. Further inquiry produced reports that conflicted with the initial
information from both the Honduran and Guatemalan governments. Id. These reports
indicated that the Costa Ricans entered and passed through Honduras, entered Guate-
mala, and went on to El Salvador. Id. at 102. Nothing in Salvadoran immigration
[VOL. 4:377
H.R. INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
mission found the government of Honduras responsible for the
disappearances73 despite the investigation.
Inadequate government investigation was also apparent in Case
9265, 7 despite Suriname's efforts to change an earlier Commission de-
cision. The government promptly responded to the petition alleging tor-
ture and due process violations." Reports of human rights violations
continued,76 causing the Commission to send a committee to Suriname
to make an on-site visit.17 The committee, through evidence and testi-
mony obtained on the visit, verified the allegations and found Suriname
in violation of the human rights of its citizens.18 The government re-
quested a reconsideration of the decision,79 but the Commission af-
firmed its earlier resolution because the government failed to provide
new evidence of improving conditions in the country.8 0
B. PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS IN PANAMA
A Commission rapporteur made the first on-site visit to Panama in
19691 to investigate alleged violations of human rights after the over-
records indicated that they had ever entered the country. Id.
73. Id. at 104. Honduras presented unsigned type-written emigration cards to prove
that the two left its territory. Id. at 103. These cards are customarily filled out by
hand, and thus did not provide convincing evidence for the Commission. Id. The Com-
mission published its findings in the 1984-1985 annual report. Id. at 104.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights rejected preliminary objections by the
government of Honduras to the Court's hearing of the case on June 26, 1987. ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AM. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 57, 79, OEA/ser. L./V/III.17,
doc. 13 (1987). The Court has jurisdiction based on Honduras' status as a party to the
American Convention and on the Court's contentious jurisdiction. Id. at 64.
74. Case 9265, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 113, OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doe. 10 rev. 1
(1985). On December 6, 1983, the Commission received the first of a number of com-
plaints against the government of Suriname for arbitrary arrest and torture of its citi-
zens. Id.
75. Id. at 114. On March 20, 1984, the IACHR received a response from the Suri-
name government denying the allegations and representing the insinuations as attempts
to discredit the government with the Commission. Id. at 114-15.
76. Id. at 115. The complaints continued, and the IACHR requested more infor-
mation on the situation. Id. The government responded, sending information about nine
of the individuals whom the government detained. Id.
77. Id. at 117.
78. Id. at 118. Interviews of civilians and recovered physical evidence corroborated
the original complaints. Id. at 118-19.
79. Id. at 119. The Government appealed the resolution of the Committee, which
found violations of articles I, XVIII, XXV and XXVI of the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man. Id.
80. See id. at 121 (affirming its earlier resolution by relying on evidence obtained
during the on-site visit and the lack of proof from the government that the violations
had not occurred).
81. Norris, In Loco, supra note 16, at 64.
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throw of the government of Arnulfo Arias in 1968.82 After a second
request, the government of Panama approved the visit of the Commis-
sion rapporteur8 3 The rapporteur and a staff lawyer went to Panama in
December of 1969 and held interviews with government officials, the
Archbishop of Panama, media representatives, and private individu-
als. 4 The government also provided three memoranda on relevant top-
ics.8 The rapporteur recommended closing the cases because the gov-
ernment demonstrated a respect for human rights of persons in its
custody. 6
The next visit was significant for several reasons. In 1977, the Pana-
manian head of state, General Torrijos, personally invited the commit-
tee to Panama for an investigation.87 It was the first one conducted
under the Commission's resolution on observations in loco which enu-
merated the privileges of the Commission and the government's respon-
sibilities during such a visit.88 The government also provided an unprec-
edented quantity of documentation both during and after the visit,
demonstrating an extremely high level of cooperation. 9
82. Human Rights Subcomm., supra note 3, at 40 (statement of Jack Hood
Vaughn, former United States Ambassador to the Republic of Panama). Colonel Omar
Torrijos and Colonel Martinez led the coup that overthrew the Arias government. Id.
at 41. Colonel Torrijos eventually became the sole head of the government. Id.
83. Norris, In Loco, supra note 16, at 64.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 64-65.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 72 n.95. In the invitation General Torrijos stated as follows:
[W]e would welcome a report and a visit of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in order that they be made aware of the reality of our policy with
regard to human rights. We invite them to travel to any part of Panama, to
speak to anyone, and to inform the world.
I believe the role of the Commission should not only be to investigate violations
of human rights, but also to disprove unfounded charges. Only in this way can
the hemisphere be free of injustice, for here they will find neither oppressors nor
oppressed.
Id; see Human Rights Subcomm., supra note 3, at 76 (testimony of Adelaide Eisen-
man, Washington representative, Panamanian Committee for Human Rights) (describ-
ing Torrijos as "the consummate politician"). Torrijos wanted to undercut the oppo-
nents of the Panama Canal Treaty that was under negotiation. Id; see also Norris, In
Loco, supra note 16, at 71 (stating that investigators discovered more human rights
violations than expected, but the report was published too late to affect the
negotiations).
88. Norris, In Loco, supra note 16, at 72.
89. Id. at 72-73. The government went beyond what was requested, allowing the
opportunity to examine the criminal justice system of Panama, as well as the relation-
ship between its constitution and the right to participate in government. Id.
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III. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN PANAMA AND CASE
9726
Since the overthrow of Arnulfo Arias in the Republic of Panama in
October of 1968, the military has run the government.9 0 As of May
1988, Manuel Solis Palma is the civilian president,' but the de facto
head of state is Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) leader, General Ma-
nuel Antonio Noriega.92 During 1985, the human rights conditions in
Panama worsened and political tensions increased .
3
90. See Human Rights Subcomm., supra note 3, at 40-41 (describing the takeover
of Panama by its military); see also id. at 40 (testimony of Jack Hood Vaughn, former
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Panama) (stating that the Panama Canal Treaty
should be called the "Torrijos-Carter Treaty" as Torrijos, not the elected Panamanian
legislature, negotiated it). The Panamanian military established its power under Tor-
rijos, and this policy continues today. Id.
91. Panama's President in Hiding, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1988, at A26. In February
of 1988, Eric del Valle tried to oust General Noriega as the head of the PDF, but
Noriega replaced him with a new president, and forced del Valle into hiding. Id. at 1.
Eric del Valle replaced Nicold.s Barletta as president of Panama when it appeared that
the latter planned to more thoroughly investigate the Spadafora murder. Id.; Hersh,
Panama Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms and Illicit Money, N.Y. Times,
June 12, 1986, at Al, A14 [hereinafter Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs].
A presidential election was held in Panama on May 7, 1989. Branigan, Opposition
Cites Fraud in Panama, Wash. Post, May 8, 1989, at Al. Although official Panama-
nian government results gave the election to Carlos Duque, the candidate backed by
General Noriega, the Panamanian opposition and international election observers
claimed massive election fraud. Branigan, Panama Offers First Vote Result, Wash.
Post, May 10, 1989, at Al; Branigan, Carter Says Noriega is Stealing Election, Wash.
Post, May 9, 1989, at Al. PDF and paramilitary forces conducted a brutal public
assault on the opposition party candidate, Guillermo Endara, and his running mates
during a motorcade to protest the election fraud. Branigan, Noriega's Forces Attack.
Club Opposition Candidates, Wash. Post, May 11, 1989, at Al. The Panamanian gov-
ernment voided the election results on May 11, 1989. National Public Radio Morning
Edition (NPR broadcast, May 11, 1989) (transcript available from NPR).
92. Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, supra note 91, at A14. United States intel-
ligence sources link General Noriega with drug trafficking, money laundering, and sup-
plying arms to the M-19, a pro-Cuban guerrilla group whose goal is to overthrow the
democratic government in Colombia. Id. See STUDY MISSION TO SE ASIA, So. AM.,
CENT. AM., AND THE CARIBBEAN, 99TH CONG., lsT SESS., U.S. NARCOTICS CONTROL
PROGRAMS OVERSEAS: AN ASSESSMENT 32 (Comm. Print 1985) (assessing Panama's
role as a transshipment point for chemicals used in the manufacture of illegal narcotics
moving south and marijuana and cocaine moving north); see also Babcock & Wood-
ward, Report on Panama General Poses Predicament for US., Wash. Post, June 13,
1986, at I (describing Reagan administration reaction to Gen. Noriega's reported links
to smuggling drugs and weapons); Herbers, Panama General Accused by Helms, N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1986, at A3 (quoting Sen. Jesse Helms describing General Noriega as
the "head of the biggest drug trafficking operation in the Western Hemisphere"); Le-
Moyne, Panama's Strongman Tries to Ride Out the Storm, N.Y. Times, June 25,
1986, at A2 (detailing Gen. Noriega's denial of allegations of his illicit activities).
93. ST. DEP'T. REP., supra note 2, at 641; Reconstruccibn del secuestro del Dr.
Ziniga revela nuevos detalles, (Reconstruction of the kidnapping of Dr. Zfiniga
reveals new details), La Prensa (Panamd), Sept. 8, 1985 at 14A. Political leader,
Mauro Zfiniga, had been kidnapped and beaten only weeks before Spadafora was
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Dr. Hugo Spadafora 4 was a major critic of General Noriega. 0
Though he received several threats because of his criticism of the PDF
chief,96 Spadafora decided to return to Panama from Costa Rica to
publicly oppose Noriega. 97 He left his home in Costa Rica on Septem-
ber 13, 1985, on his regular route to Panama.98 Witnesses saw a guard
taking him off a bus in Concepci6n, Panamd and accompanying him to
the PDF station in Concepci6n.99 On September 14, 1985, a Costa Ri-
killed. Id.; Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, supra note 91, at A14; Supplemental
Petition, supra note 1, at 34. President Nicolds Barletta resigned under pressure from
the PDF after promising to appoint a special commission to investigate the murder of
Spadafora. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 176, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev.
1 (1988); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 34.
94. See Case 9726, INTER-AM C.H.R. 174, 175, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doc. 10
rev. 1 (1988); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 11 and accompanying text
(describing the public offices that Hugo Spadafora previously held).
95. Id. at 12; Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, supra note 91, at A14; ST.
DEP'T. REP., supra note 2, at 640; Rare Violence Hits Quiet Province; Fire-Bombings,
Beheading Plague Panama Area, Miami Herald, July 23, 1986, at 6A. From 1980
until the time of his death, Spadafora made public accusations against General
Noriega, charging him with corruption, drug trafficking, and other illegal activities. ST.
DEP'T. REP., supra note 2, at 640.
96. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 13. Spadafora revealed in a radio in-
terview on January 18, 1982 that General Noriega sent several threats to him through
friends and relatives. Id. These included that the PDF "was looking for him," "any day
now, he could die," that he had been "tried and sentenced," and he already "had one
foot in the grave." Id.; see Spadaforafue victima de eje narco-politico (Spadafora was
a victim of a narco-political organization), La Naci6n (Costa Rica), Nov. 25, 1986 at
9A (discussing the possible connection of Spadafora's death with an investigation of
drug trafficking in Central America). The Judicial Investigation Office (OIJ) of the
Costa Rican government taped the telephone conversations of suspected drug traffick-
ers. Id. The tapes included references which could be construed as threats on
Spadafora's life. Id.
97. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 15. Spadafora planned to collect evi-
dence against Noriega and the PDF to give to his lawyer, Alvin Weeden Gamboa, who
was to provide it to the Panamanian tribunals as well as make it public information.
Noriega ordenb el asesinato (Noriega ordered the assassination), Rumbo Centroameri-
cano (Costa Rica), Sept. 26, 1985, at 14. Weeden Gamboa confirmed that he had
agreed to meet with Spadafora when he arrived in Panama. Id.
98. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 17. In a three to four month period
prior to his death, Spadafora returned to Panama City using the same travel itinerary.
Id.
99. En Pocas Palabras, supra note 2. Witnesses reported that after being escorted
from the bus, Spadafora walked down the street showing his national identity card to
everyone he passed. Id. He also orally identified himself saying, "I am Dr. Hugo
Spadafora and they are detaining me." Id.; see Decision of Fourth Superior Court of
the Third Judicial District (David, Panama) Feb. 7, 1986 (Almendral, Mag., dissent-
ing) at 46, reprinted in Appendix to Supplemental Petition, Violations of the Human
Rights of Hugo Spadafora by the Republic of Panama (IACHR Case 9726), sec. 43,
at 46 (1986) [hereinafter 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama)] (criticizing the failure to investigate
the claims of witnesses who saw Spadafora enter the PDF station at Concepci6n).
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can citizen discovered a headless body lying under a bridge in
Quebrada el Roblito, Laurel, Costa Rica, a town located several hun-
dred meters east of the border of Panama.1
00
The Costa Rican government ordered a thorough investigation of the
murder. 01 The autopsy indicated that Spadafora was tortured for four
to six hours and was still alive when beheaded. 0 2 After interviewing
members of the Spadafora family, witnesses who saw Spadafora in
Panamanian territory, and people who saw PDF vehicles in the area
where his body was discovered, Costa Rican authorities concluded that
the killing took place in Panama.0 3
On September 18, 1985, in a televised speech, Panamanian President
Nicol.s Barletta ordered military and civilian authorities with jurisdic-
tion over the case to conduct an investigation.'" The Public Ministry,
100. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 29; 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama), supra
note 99 at 35. Costa Rican authorities identified the body as that of Spadafora, initially
because of a scar on the right leg, and later through fingerprints. 4th Sup. Ct. (Pan-
ama), supra note 99, at 35. The head was never found. 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama), supra
note 96, at 35; Spadafora fue victima de eje narco-politico, supra note 96, at 8A.
101. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 30; see Spadafora fie victima de eje
narco-politico, supra note 96, at 1 (describing the outcome of the murder investigation
as part of a plot to discourage those who try to interfere with the illegal drug trade in
Central America).
102. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 29. The autopsy also noted that "F-8"
was scratched on Spadafora's back. Id. This symbol is linked to an Army unit named
"F-7," a pro-government group active during 1984. Id; see also STATE DEIT. REP.,
supra note 2, at 641 (confirming that both Spadafora and Mauro Zilniga, an opposition
leader who was kidnapped a month before, were found with the "F-8" inscription);
Case 9726, INTER-A_ s C.H.R. 174, 176, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doe. 10 rev. 1 (1988)
(stating the Panamanian government's intent to investigate Spadafora's death). Upon
his return from New York, President Nicold.s Barletta saw "F-8" scratched on one of
the windows of his plane. Id. He was forced to resign shortly thereafter. Id.
103. STATE DEP'T REP., supra note 2, at 31; see Affidavit of Ivan Gonzllez Jus-
tavino, Sept. 24, 1985 (stating that Spadafora ate lunch at his restaurant, CafE Los
Mellos, located on the Panamanian side of the border); Affidavit of Edwin Guerra,
Sept. 25, 1985 (stating that Spadafora boarded his bus that goes to David, Panama);
Affidavit of Santos L6pes Lob6n, Sept. 17, 1985 (stating that he saw Spadafora at a
PDF checkpoint in Jacfi, Panama); Affidavit of Ricaute Esquivel Rodriguez, Septem-
ber 17, 1985 (stating that he saw Spadafora at a PDF checkpoint in Jacz, Panamdi);
Affidavit of Jos6 Asdrfibal Ramirez Chavarria, Sept. 1985 (stating that he saw vehicles
like the ones used by the PDF driving in Quebrada el Roblito, Laurel, Panama the
night of Sept. 13, 1985). The affidavits of numerous witnesses who saw Spadafora in
Panama support the Costa Rican government's finding that Spadafora entered Pan-
ama, although there was no record of his entry in the Panamanian immigration
records; see also Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 17. Spadafora crossed into
Panama on foot from Paso Canoas. Id. at 19. Because of the informality of this cross-
ing, many pass back and forth between the two territories without record from either
Panamanian or Costa Rican immigration authorities. Id.
104. Statement by President Nicol.s Ardito Barletta (Panama City Circuito RPC
Television broadcast, Sept. 18, 1985); see Statement by General Staff of the Defense
Forces (Panama City Televisora Nacional Television broadcast, Sept. 18, 1985) (dis-
claiming any PDF involvement in the death). The statement also included references to
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headed by the Attorney General, initially detained three members of
the PDF.1 5 The Fourth Superior Court of the Third Judicial District
(David) dismissed the charges.0 6
On September 25, 1985, a number of prominent Panamanian organi-
zations announced their support of the demand by the Spadafora fam-
ily for an independent investigation. 0 7 Barletta announced that he
would appoint a commission that was free of PDF influence, but under
pressure from the PDF, he resigned before making any appoint-
ments.10 8 His successor, Eric Arturo del Valle, claimed he could not
appoint an independent commission under the Panamanian constitu-
Spadafora's "adventurous lifestyle" and "strong political differences with various ideo-
logical sectors that color the revolutionary spectrum of Central America and other ar-
eas." Id.; Assembly Condemns Assassination, La Prensa (Panamdi), Sept. 18, 1985, at
1 (reporting the National Assembly's denunciation of the killing). The Legislative As-
sembly issued a resolution condemning the assassination as "abominable and treacher-
ous" and "incompatible with the basic character of the Panamanian people." Id. The
resolution passed twenty-three to two with fifteen abstentions after a heated six-hour
debate. Id. Primera Fiscalia Superior del Tercer Distrito Judicial, Sept. 17, 1985, re-
printed in Appendix to Supplemental Petition, Violations of the Human Rights of
Hugo Spadafora by the Republic of Panama (IACHR Case 9726), sec. 29, 1-3 (1986)
(specifying the inclusion of necessary information in the investigation of Spadafora's
death).
105. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 177, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1988); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 35. See 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama), supra
note 99 (citing the sworn statements of the three men implicated in the Spadafora
killing).
106. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 177, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1988); 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama), supra note 99, at 42. Francisco GonzAlez Bonilla,
Omar Vega Miranda, and Eliecer Ramos have been completely absolved from any con-
nection in the death of Spadafora. Id. Contra 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama) (Almendral,
Mag. dissenting), supra note 99, at 44 (noting a lack of evidence and inconsistencies in
the investigation). In his dissent, Judge Almendral criticizes the lack of investigation.
Id. at 46. The detainees could account for their whereabouts during part of the day,
but not during the time which the autopsy reported as the time of death. Id. at 47. The
Panamanian Public Ministry also failed to corroborate the whereabouts of the suspects
after their statements were made. Id. at 45. The magistrate dissents on the grounds
that the evidence does not clearly support the suspects' claims of innocence, nor was
the quality of the investigation satisfactory. Id.
107. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 33; ST. DEPT. REP., supra note 2, at
641; Los empresarios piden a Barletta atienda pedido de los Spadafora (Businessmen
ask Barletta to attend to the request of the Spadafora family), La Prensa (Panamd),
Sept. 25, 1985, at 1. Organizations calling for the independent investigation included
Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Privada (CONEP, the National Council of Private
Enterprise), the Panamanian Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, the
Panamanian Association of Business Executives, and the Catholic Church. Id.
108. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 176, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1988); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 34. Barletta made the announcement
regarding the investigation before leaving on a trip to the United Nations, but was
forced to resign the day after his return. Id.; Panama's Strongman Tries to Ride Out
the Storm, supra note 92, at A2; ST. DEP'T. REP., supra note 2, at 641; Strongman
Said to Trade in Drugs, supra note 91, at A14; Panama General Reported to Rig
Election, supra note 3, at 12.
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tion. 0 9 No further action was taken in the case until June 1986, when
the Supreme Court of Panama declared that the case was closed and
that it would not hear an appeal. 110
B. PRESENTATION OF THE CASE TO THE COMMISSION
Winston Spadafora filed a petition with the Commission on May 7,
1986,111 accusing the Panamanian government of violating the human
rights of his brother.11 2 The petition called for a thorough and indepen-
dent investigation of the murder with no interference from the PDF." 3
The Commission admitted the petition in October 1986.1" Lawyers
representing Winston Spadafora submitted comments on the response
of the Panamanian government on April 17, 1987.11 5 The Commission
resolved the case on September 23, 1987, finding that the government
of Panama failed to thoroughly investigate the Spadafora murder."'
The government of Panama had sixty days to respond to the Commis-
sion's resolution, 17 but the response was not filed until January 25,
109. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 34. See ST. DEP'T. REP., supra note 2,
at 641 (quoting an earlier statement by Barletta that he had no constitutional power to
appoint an independent investigative commission).
110. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 110, 110-11, OEA/ser. L./V/IH.71, doe. 9 rev.
1 (1987); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 36.
111. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 175, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1988); Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 110, 110, OEA/ser. L./V/11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1
(1987); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 1.
112. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 174, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doe. 10 rev. 1
(1988); Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 110, 110, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1
(1987); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 4. Winston Spadafora alleged human
rights violations that included arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty, inhumane treat-
ment, denial of freedom of thought and expression, and the lack of judicial protection.
American Convention, supra note 7, arts. 4, 5, 7, 13, 25.
113. Case 9726, INTER-A . C.H.R. 174, 174, OEA/ser. L./V/11.74, doe. 10 rev. 1
(1988); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 53-54.
114. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 110, 111, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doe. 9 rev. 1
(1987).
115. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 190, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1988); LAv GROUP DOCKET, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, (Sum-
mer 1987) at 6. The International Human Rights Law Group filed a Supplemental
Petition and had a hearing with the Commission in September 1986. Id. It had further
hearings with the Commission in March and June, 1987. Id.
116. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 234, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1988). The Commission agreed with the dissent of Judge Almendral, who believed the
investigation was inadequate and full of contradictions. Id. at 179-81. The Commission
recommended that the government of Panama conduct an exhaustive investigation into
the Spadafora homicide. Id. at 234; Dorsey, Commission Scores Panama on Killing.
Wants Inquiry, Wash. Times, Oct. 6, 1987, at A6.
117. Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 234, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doe. 10
(1988); Commission Scores Panama on Killing, Wants Inquiry, supra note 116, at A6;
American Convention, supra note 7, art. 51 (granting the Commission the power to
make recommendations to any state to remedy a situation within a prescribed time
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1988.118 In the petition for reconsideration, the Panamanian govern-
ment attempted to refute the Commission's findings. 19
IV. ANALYSIS
The Commission and other international organizations have estab-
lished expectations for state responsibility. 20 What is still lacking is a
standard for investigation in torture and arbitrary death cases, such as
the Spadafora case, in which the victim is a citizen of the state con-
ducting the investigation. The quality of the investigation may fluctuate
for a number of reasons including lack of cooperation by the investigat-
ing authorities, discovery of evidence, medical expertise and available
facilities, and the independence of the judiciary.'21 No uniform interna-
tional standard of investigative responsibility exists for the protection of
both alien and non-alien victims.1
22
A. THE NEED FOR A DEFINED INTERNATIONAL STANDARD OF
RESPONSIBILITY
The situation in Panama exemplifies the need for guidelines outlining
investigative responsibility on an international level. The government of
Panama avoided making an independent investigation of the Spadafora
case by interpreting its constitution accordingly. 23 The government of
Costa Rica completed its investigation, concluding that Spadafora died
in Panama, and provided this information to the government of Pan-
period).
118. Petition by the Panamanian government to the IACHR for Reconsideration of
Resolution 25/87 of Case 9726 (Jan. 25, 1988) (on file with the American University
Journal of International Law and Policy).
119. Id. In the three part, 137 page petition for reconsideration, the government of
Panama describes itself as a victim of misinformation and contradictory statements
made by a number of officials and citizens aiming to destabilize the country. Id.
120. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing the international norm
of state responsibility in investigations); Farer, Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Is
the Liberal Model Sufficient?, 7 HuM. RTs. Q. 189, 193 (1985) [hereinafter Farcr,
Human Rights and Wrongs] (maintaining that the Commission repeatedly affirms that
governments have a duty to maintain the degree of order needed for the practical reali-
zation of human rights).
121. See infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text (discussing problems faced in
human rights investigations).
122. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (citing international norms for
state responsibility, none for international investigative norms).
123. Case 9726, IrrER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 177, OEA/ser. L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1988); Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 34. President del Valle refused to ap-
point an independent investigating commission despite a letter signed by over 120 law-
yers and the National Association of Lawyers (Panama), denying any alleged unconsti-
tutionality. Id.; see supra note 107 and accompanying text (describing that
Panamanian businesses and organizations supported an independent investigation).
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ama. 24 The Panamanian Fourth Judicial District, in its decision to re-
lease the suspects in the case, relied in part on the Costa Rican findings
and rejected other information including affidavits of witnesses con-
tained in the same report.125 Even after the Costa Rican report was
released, the government of Panama continued its refusal to investi-
gate, denying Spadafora's family the opportunity to reopen the case.126
This selective interpretation of investigative responsibility not only at-
tempts to pass the investigative responsibility back to Costa Rica, but
also indicates that Panama confines the duty to protect its citizens to
its political boundaries.
It is important to note the difference between investigations and
sanctions. In the case of the Commission, publishing the resolution of a
case in its annual report is the sanction.1217 Sanctions are not part of the
investigatory process, but arise from it.1 28 They are externally imposed
on the state after it is found in violation of the human rights of groups
or individuals . 29 The sanction imposed reflects the international reac-
tion to the violation, the expression of the rights of the injured parties,
and the condemnation of such actions.' 30
In the absence of an international standard for investigation, the re-
sponsibility is left to the individual state.1 31 In theory, each state will
assume the responsibility of thoroughly investigating a case and punish-
124. See Supplemental'Petition, supra note 1, at 30-31 (observing that the Costa
Rican Public Ministry's findings included a recommendation for a thorough investiga-
tion by the Government of Panama); see also 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama), supra note 99
(basing its conclusions on the Costa Rican report).
125. See 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama) (Almendral, Mag., dissenting), supra note 99, at
45 (dissenting on the grounds that the evidence was not conclusive and that the other
judges selectively evaluated the facts).
126. Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 36. See Case 9726, INTER-Am. C.H.R.
110, 111, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1986) (confirming that all domestic
remedies were exhausted in Panama).
127. See American Convention, supra note 7, art. 51(3) (articulating the power of
the Commission to publish a report if the state has not taken appropriate measures).
Article 51(3) provides, " [w]hen the prescribed period has expired, the Commission
shall decide by the vote of an absolute majority of its members whether the state has
taken adequate measures and whether to publish its report." Id.
128. Vassilenko, supra note 13, at 82. The author makes a distinction between the
framework of international law and sanctions and coercive measures applied to secure
compliance with international law norms. Id. at 81-82.
129. Id. at 81.
130. Id. at 81-82.
131. Chueca Sancho, Los Derechos Humanos Protegidos en la Convencibn Ameri-
cana de San Jose de 1969 (Human Rights Protected in the American Convention of
San Jose of 1969), 32 REv. ESPAROLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 33, 38 (1980).
But see Farer, Human Rights and Wrongs, supra note 120, at 191 (demonstrating,
through an investigation in Argentina during the "guerra sucia," or dirty war, the
problems surrounding government investigations when the government is involved in
the human rights abuses).
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ing the offending party.13 2 The assumed responsibility varies among
states. The investigation is then the product of internal or external pub-
lic opinion and pressure that often results in frustrated efforts and un-
answered questions for human rights organizations. 33
B. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Problems with the interpretation of investigative duty arise from the
ambiguous standard of investigative responsibility.1 34 The ambiguity is
deliberate because nations are reluctant to limit their state sover-
eignty.135 By assuming the responsibility of an investigation, the state
relinquishes a certain amount of its sovereignty.138
Countries historically have sought to protect their rights and limit
the interference of other states in their internal affairs. 37 Largely for
132. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 164; Chueca Sancho, supra note 131, at 38.
133. See INTER-AM. C.H.R. 99, OEA/ser. L./V/1.68, doc. 8 rev. 1 (1986) (citing
failures to respond to IACHR inquiries in cases 9144, 9295, 9289, 9367, 9170, 9296,
9341, 9344, and 9284, as noted in their resolutions). The Commission cited inadequate
responses in two other published cases. Id; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1987
REPORT (reporting the organization's findings on the human rights situations of many
countries). Amnesty International, a non-governmental organization (NGO), publishes
an annual report on the human rights conditions in well over 100 countries. Id. at 1. Its
findings of the twenty-seven countries listed in its Americas section have closing state-
ments, including one declaring that Amnesty International is not aware of "any steps
taken to clarify the 'disappearances' and bring to justice those responsible" in the Do-
minican Republic. Id. at 156. Another statement, about Haiti, reveals that Amnesty is
not aware of "any inquiry being ordered, or any general measures being taken to pre-
vent the ill-treatment of detainees". Id. at 177. Finally, in its investigation in Cuba, it
"repeatedly asked the government (without any reply) as to the whereabouts of these
two prisoners." Id. at 154.
134. See Mullerson, Functioning of International Laws and Internal Law of
States, 24 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 40, 48 (1984) (attributing distorted applications of inter-
national law to the different ways that states govern their internal relations). Mullerson
states that international and municipal law must interact with each other to regulate
different, more encompassing social systems. Id. at 52.
135. See id. at 41 (supporting the distinction between the legal system of a state
and the independent realm of international law).
136. Vassilenko, supra note 13, at 81.
137. Briggs, The United States and the International Court of Justice: A Re-ex-
amination, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 904 (L. Gross ed.
1969). Briggs cites the reservation made by the United States while accepting the juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice. Id. The reservation states that matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States are determined by
United States courts. Id.; see Cabranes, The Protection of Human Rights by the Or-
ganization of American States, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 889, 906 (1968) (expressing the
concern over foreseeable conflicts between the OAS and member states in human
rights investigations because of their characteristics as interveners in the internal af-
fairs of a member state); see also Garcia Rend6n, La Proteccibn de los Derechos
Humanos en el Piano Universal (The Protection of Human Rights in the Universal
Plane), 24 REVISTA DE JURISPRUDENCIA PERUANA 1000, 1001 (1966) (describing the
concerns of states before adopting the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
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this reason, the United States, although a signatory to several human
rights conventions, has failed to ratify them.138 Another example is the
Calve Doctrine, 39 which the majority of American states adopted as
an attempt to guard the right to limit protection extended to foreign
nationals.14 °
Investigations are now conducted according to the standards existing
in each country. The then President of Panama, Eric Arturo del Valle,
claimed that constitutional limitations constrained him in the
Spadafora case. 14 Another example revealing the problem of maintain-
ing state sovereignty in an arbitrary death situation is the case of four
churchwomen who were raped and murdered in El Salvador in Decem-
ber of 1980.142 El Salvadoran government officials, in violation of do-
Rights); Mullerson, supra note 134, at 40 (discussing the interaction of state law with
international law).
138. Sepfilveda, supra note 13, at 1058. C~sar Sepfilveda, a former member of the
Commission, sees the lack of participation by the United States as a protectionist and
regressive tactic that is lamentable from a country that could lead the cause of human
rights. Id.; see Schoultz, The Carter Administration and Human Rights in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND BASIc NEEDS IN THE AIERIcAS, 301, 302 (M. Crahan ed. 1982) (describ-
ing the high profile that human rights took in United States foreign policy during the
Carter administration). The human rights policy of the Reagan administration concen-
trates on ideological adversaries, and any attention given to the human rights policies
of countries such as El Salvador and Chile is dealt with quiet diplomacy. Id. at 334.
139. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 202.
140. Id. The Calvo Clause, presently known as the Calvo Doctrine, was named
after Carlos Calvo, an Argentine diplomat and publicist. Id. at 603. He published a
treatise in 1868 proposing that free and independent sovereign states enjoy the right, on
the basis of equality, to be free of any sort of interference, and that aliens are entitled
only to the rights that are accorded to nationals. Id.; Wells, The Institutional Frame-
work of Inter-American Relations, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 223, 227-28 (1983) [herein-
after Institutional Framework]. At the first International Conference of American
States, all of the Latin American countries but one voted for a declaration based on the
Doctrine. Id. at 228. The United States, however, blocked further discussion of it at the
next five consecutive meetings. Id. The First International Conference of American
States, a forerunner of the Organization of American States, met in Washington, D.C.
in 1889. Id. at 223. The nations represented at that conference were as follows: Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, M6xico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Per, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. at
n.1.
141. See Case 9726, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 174, 177, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.74, doc. 10
rev. 1 (1988) (viewing President del Valle as uninterested in investigating Spadafora's
death). President del Valle said that he was not able to appoint an investigative com-
mittee. Id.; Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 34 (describing President del Valle's
contention that the Panamanian constitution does not give him the power to appoint an
independent investigative committee).
142. THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HublN RIGHTS, UPDATE:
THE CASE OF FOUR U.S. CHURCHWOMEN MURDERED IN EL SALVADOR IN DECEMBER
1980 8 (1984) [hereinafter Rep. on El Salvador]. On December 2, 1980, Salvadoran
National Guardsmen raped and killed three Maryknoll nuns, and a church worker in
El Salvador. Id. at 10. Villagers discovered the bodies the following day, and Salvado-
ran officials conducted investigations without notifying authorities in the United States.
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mestic laws, attempted to thwart investigation of the crime.""3 Dissatis-
fied with El Salvador's investigative efforts,1"4 United States authorities
conducted laboratory tests to help identify the suspects.14 Salvadoran
domestic trial laws, however, only admit evidence obtained within Sal-
vadoran territory. 46 While some of the evidence was duplicated in El
Salvador under the supervision of a Salvadoran judge, it was not possi-
ble to reproduce all of the evidence.
147
In the Spadafora case, an autopsy performed in Costa Rica was ac-
cepted by the Panamanian court.148 This is an exception, rather than
the rule because of the varying medical standards and facilities in dif-
ferent countries.1 49 Dr. Jorgen Thomsen, 50 a Danish physician who has
observed autopsies in other countries, believes that existing model au-
topsy reports provide good checklists, but they do not address the spe-
cifics of human rights injuries.' He also considers examining photos
taken at autopsies inconclusive as evidence of torture. 2
Standards for the discovery and maintenance of evidence are difficult
to establish. As demonstrated in the case of the churchwomen mur-
dered in El Salvador, officials may mishandle or store evidence in such
Id. at 11-12. A priest who worked with the women discovered their burned out van. Id.
at 12. The Vicar of the San Vicente diocese notified the United States Embassy of the
burial. Id.; Bodies of Four American Women are Found in El Salvador, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1980, at A3; DeOnis, U.S. Suspends New Aid to Salvador Until American
Deaths are Clarified, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1980, at Al.
143. Rep. on El Salvador, supra note 142, at 22-23.
144. Id. at 16.
145. Id. at 17. The FBI conducted ballistics tests that connected shell casings
found at the murder scene with weapons belonging to the National Guard. Id.
146. Id. at 18. According to Judge Bernardo Rauda Murcia, evidence would not be
admitted at trial if it was obtained outside Salvadoran territory and without his super-
vision. Id. The confession of Dagoberto Martinez and the ballistics tests were therefore
repeated in El Salvador, and thus became admissible. Id.
147. Id. at 18-19. A thumbprint of one of the suspects was found on the
churchwomen's van, but the test could not be reproduced because the van was stored in
an open lot, thus exposing all evidence that could have been obtained from it. Id. To
make an investigation more difficult, guards involved in the murder were transferred
from their posts, and their weapons were switched to make detection more difficult. Id.
at 22.
148. 4th Dist. Sup. Ct. (Panama), supra note 99, at 35.
149. MINNESOTA CONF. REP., supra note 52, at 2. After a 1983 Amnesty Interna-
tional mission to El Salvador, a forensic pathologist noted a lack of forensic expertise
necessary to detect serious crimes. Id. Another physician described autopsies he ob-
served in the Philippines as crude and unsophisticated. Id.
150. Id. Dr. Thomsen spoke of the problems of conducting autopsies and other fo-
rensic medical tests in countries where facilities or expertise of the local doctors are not






a manner that it is rendered useless. It is both ineffective and diffi-
cult to impound evidence obtained in torture cases unless the investiga-
tors can act almost immediately.15' Statements from witnesses concern-
ing torture, arbitrary death, and detention cases are indispensible, but
it is difficult, if not impossible, to offer witness protection.155 Prosecu-
tion and harassment of these witnesses is well documented. 50 Family
members who pursue cases, as well as actual witnesses, are subjected to
these methods.
157
The independence and impartiality of the judiciary from other
branches of the government is an additional concern.158 The courts of a
state are responsible for rendering impartial decisions.1 9 The current
153. See supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text (summarizing the case of the
murdered churchwomen and the problems encountered with the handling of the
evidence).
154. MINNEsOTA CONF. REP., supra note 52, at 3. While recognizing the difficulty
experienced in most human rights cases of impounding weapons, Professor Paul
Chevigny, a conferee, emphasized that it was nonetheless important. Id.
155. Id. at 4. Although not an optimistic suggestion, Professor Chevigny reiterated
the importance of having witnesses testify voluntarily. Id. See Grossman, Prosecuting
Human Rights Cases in Latin America: Can It Be Done Without Backlash?, Los An-
geles Daily Journal, April 11, 1988, at 4 (discussing the problem of witnesses being
killed as in the case of those who were called to testify against the government of
Honduras in a case before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
156. MINNESOTA CONF. REP., supra note 52, at 3. In Brazil, at least sixteen people
interviewed in a death squad investigation were killed, and literally thousands more
fear for their lives. Id.; Spadafora Case Witness Murdered in Chiriqui, Extra (Pan-
ama), Oct. 7, 1985, at 1, reprinted in Appendix to Supplemental Petition, Violations of
the Human Rights of Hugo Spadafora by the Republic of Panama (IACHR Case
9726), at 32 (1986). A woman who witnessed PDF members arresting Hugo Spadafora
died in a brutal, but unsolved murder. Id.
157. Contrapunto: Persecucibn imbbcil e inttil (Counterpoint: Stupid and useless
persecution), La Prensa (Panama), Aug. 23, 1986, reprinted in Appendix to Supple-
mental Petition, Violations of the Human Rights of Hugo Spadafora by the Republic
of Panama (IACHR Case 9726), at 42 (1986). The members of Hugo Spadafora's
family have become the targets of public and private intimidation. Id. In this article,
Winston Spadafora describes his frustration and anger at the persecution of his family.
Id. Carmenza Mata a Niha de 14 Anbs (Carmenza Kills a 14 Year-old Girl), Critica
(Panama), at 1, reprinted in Appendix to Supplemental Petition, Violations of the
Human Rights of Hugo Spadafora by the Republic of Panama (IACHR Case 9726),
at 35 (1986). This article describes a car accident involving Carmenza Spadafora. Id.
It describes her as "a killer" at the wheel. Id.
158. See Supplemental Petition, supra note 1, at 37 (discussing the view that the
court system would not implicate the PDF in any wrongdoing concerning Spadafora);
Case 9201, IrER-Ai. C.H.R. 57, 65-74, OEA/ser. L./V/II.68, doe. 8 rev. 1 (1986)
(precluding an administrative settlement of the case because of the denial of a fair trial
by the Nicaraguan government).
159. The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees: Study on
the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors and Assessors and the
Independence of Lawyers, 38 U.N. ESCOR at 1, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/18
(Agenda Item 9(c) at 27) (1985) [hereinafter Impartiality of the Judiciary]. The sub-
commission gave the following summary of the traditional theory and practice of state
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standards of state responsibility extend only to aliens in state courts
when denial of justice is alleged.600 The dissent in the Spadafora case
asserts that the Panamanian government failed to conduct a thorough
investigation."' 1 Panama relied on the doctrine of state responsibility
and placed the burden on Costa Rica of conducting an investigation in
Costa Rica; the investigation took place, and the report of the findings
was made public.'6 2 The issue, therefore, is not whether a state failed
to fulfill its responsibility towards an alien, but the formulation of the
appropriate standard when a state apparently fails to adequately inves-
tigate a case concerning one of its nationals. The same standard for an
alien can be used for the protection of its nationals through a change of
responsibility for denial of justice to aliens:
(a) the existence of identifiable norms of civilized society in respect of an ade-
quate, effective and reasonably expeditious machinery for the administration of
justice;
(b) independence, impartiality, objectivity, integrity, probity and honesty of
judges and tribunals;
(c) an adherence to and respect for international law, treaty obligations, and
duties of the State;
(d) reasonably, easy and equal access to the justice system for nationals and
aliens alike; and
(e) responsibility of a State for any miscarriage or denial of justice in interna-
tional law attributable to any branch or organ of the state.
Id.; RESTATEMENT, supra note 50 § 165 (1965). The Restatement (Second) considers a
denial of justice in procedural terms. Id. Conduct causing injury to an alien is treat-
ment that departs from the generally accepted norms of conduct of legal proceedings,
and/or the failure to provide the alien with an adequate remedy in the administration
of justice. Id.; see Maiorano, Responsibilidad del Estado por los errores judiclales:
otra forma de proteger los derechos humanos (Responsibility of the State for judicial
error: another form of protecting human rights), REVISTA JURIDIcA ARGENTINA, LA
LEY 983, 983 (1984) (proposing a type of judicial review as one method of correcting
judicial error in criminal cases).
160. Impartiality of the Judiciary, supra note 159, at 22. The Institute of Interna-
tional Law adopted the following principle in 1927 of state responsibility for denial of
justice:
V. The State is responsible on the score of denial of justice:
1. When the tribunals necessary to assure protection to foreigners do not exist or
do not function.
2. When the tribunals are not accessible to foreigners.
3. When the tribunals do not offer the guarantees which are indispensable to the
proper administration of justice.
VI. The State is likewise responsible if the procedure or the judgement is mani-
festly unjust, especially if they have been inspired by ill-will toward foreigners, as
such, or as citizens of a particular State.
Id. at 21-22, quoting 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 330, 331 (1928). A denial of justice may
occur both when courts refuse redress to an alien, and when the court perpetrates the
injustice. Id. at 23. It is defined as an international wrong or delinquency that implies
an international obligation on the part of the State. Id. at 24-25.
161. 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama) (Almendral, Mag., dissenting), supra note 99, at 44-
50.
162. 4th Sup. Ct. (Panama), supra note 99, at 7-8.
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the definition of state responsibility, from the protection of "aliens" to
that of "individuals," thereby eliminating the distinction in human
rights documents.
1 3
The concerns over state sovereignty must not preclude the setting of
an effective standard of investigative responsibility. As parties to the
OAS Charter,'" the majority of countries of the Western Hemisphere
recognize the need for international norms. The Commission must de-
fine its expectations for both member parties16 5 and non-parties
alike."6 A guideline setting specific expectations for conducting a
human rights investigation will help eliminate some inconsistencies that
have plagued human rights investigations for years. 07
VI. RECOMMENDATION
A. A DEFINED INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 24, 48, AND 50 OF
THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
A stricter interpretation of American Convention articles would pro-
vide the most effective means to implement a more defined standard of
responsibility for states in the Inter-American system. Many Latin
American nations already have a constitutional provision stating that
they adhere to international law. 68 While such a provision is not essen-
tial in the formulation of a standard of responsibility, it could aid in
163. Impartiality of the Judiciary, supra note 159, at 26. Professor Phillip Jessup
observed that by changing the responsibility of states from "aliens" to "individuals,"
the scope of human rights law would greatly increase. Id. (citing A Modern Law of
Nations, 97 (1948); see U.N. CHARTER, supra note 46, art. 1(3) (including the promo-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all as a primary goal).
164. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (describing the OAS and naming
the member states).
165. See American Convention, supra note 7, art. 51 (prescribing recommenda-
tions and remedies to member states when appropriate).
166. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (naming the OAS states that have
or have not ratified the American Convention).
167. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (citing past cases where the
state failed to investigate or answer inquiries about human rights violations).
168. Krishnamurthy, Functioning of International Law and Internal Law of States
- Postures, Practices and Perspectives, 24 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 25, 31 (1984). In 1916,
the American Institute of International Law stated in the following its declaration of
the rights and duties of nations:
International law is at one and the same time, both national and international;
national in the sense that it is a law of the land and applicable as such to the
decision of all questions involving its principles; international in the sense that it
is law of the society and the nations and applicable as such to all questions be-
tween and among the members of the societies of nations involving its members.
Id. quoting article VI of the Declaration, 10 AtER. J. INT'L L. 124 (1916). See CoN-
STITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPLBUCA DE PANAN.I art. 4 (Panama) (stating that "The
Republic of Panama respects norms of international law").
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enforcement.
The Commission, as an organ of the OAS,0 9 may request the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights'"0 (Court) to issue an advisory
opinion.17' The Court's opinion, while not binding on the parties to the
OAS Charter,17 2 will set the groundwork for the Commission's more
defined interpretation of the convention articles. Using the Court's
opinion, the Commission could interpret more decisively the investiga-
tive responsibility of the state.
A more defined interpretation of some articles of the American Con-
vention would assist in defining the investigative responsibility stan-
dard. In article 24 concerning equal protection,73 the Court could clar-
ify the meaning of equal protection in terms of investigative
responsibility to its citizens. States have an obligation to protect their
nationals. 174 The Commission should specifically address whether this
provision applies only when the citizen is within the territory of the
state, or outside as well. Equal treatment of each individual case during
the investigation, as well as a uniform format of investigative require-
ments, is necessary if the violation occurs outside the territory of the
accused state. The Court should maintain a realistic level of expecta-
tion in certain technical aspects of the investigation, such as the availa-
bility of laboratory facilities and the training of physicians in specific
kinds of physical and forensic pathology.
17
With regard to procedure and initial investigations as set forth in
169. See OAS Charter, supra note 7, ch. X, (d) (listing the IACHR as an organ of
the OAS).
170. American Convention, supra note 7, arts. 52-69.
171. Id. art. 64; see Buergenthal, Advisory Practice, supra note 18, at 1 (discussing
the Inter-American Court procedure for issuing advisory opinions); Alzamora, Protec-
cibn de los Derechos Humanos en el Sistema Inter-americano, 34 REVISTA DE DER-
ECHO Y CIENCIAS POLfTCAS 13, 27 (1970) (indicating the function of the advisory
opinion); Lockwood, Advisory Options of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 245, 245-46 (1984) [hereinafter Lockwood, Advisory Op-
tions] (describing the advisory opinion as an important step forward for the protection
of human rights); Note, "Other Treaties" The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights Defines its Advisory Jurisdiction, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 211, 213-15 (1983) (ex-
amining the use and practice of the Court's advisory opinion process).
172. See Buergenthal, Advisory Practice, supra note 18, at 79 (indicating that the
advisory opinion process is not a formal proceeding, but instead provides a judicial
interpretation for OAS member states and OAS organs).
173. American Convention, supra note 7.
174. RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 165. The international standard for state re-
sponsibility to its own nationals is suggested by the United Nations Charter which
states a goal of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. U.N.
CHARTER art. 1(3).
175. MINNESOTA CONF. REP., supra note 52, at 2.
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article 48 of the American Convention, 176 the Court could create a pro-
vision to increase the number of on-site visits and conduct as many
follow-up visits as deemed necessary. Local investigative authorities
would have the duty to perform a thorough and impartial investigation
and provide the Commission with any information that it requests. If it
appears that some sort of irregularity exists, the Commission could re-
quire an independent investigation when the circumstances indicate
that the government of the state is a party to the alleged violation. If
the state investigation appears inadequate, the Commission would then
make its own inquiry. States that have ratified the convention must
permit these visits. 177 Non-party states, while not required to allow
these visits, would receive a request to allow them. If the non-party
state is aware of the investigation requirements, it may allow the visit
more readily.
The Court could interpret article 50 concerning procedure and evalu-
ation1 78 to require a minimum standard of information necessary to
evaluate an alleged violation. This standard would include the type of
investigation conducted, who conducted the investigation, specific find-
ings on the case, and a report filed within a specific period of time.
These requirements provide the framework of the investigative expecta-
tions of the Commission. The interpretation should also include specific
requirements, similar to proposals of the Minnesota Conference partici-
pants, including power to conduct the investigations, power to grant
immunity in order to obtain testimony, witness protection, and legal
proceedings . 79 Though it is impossible for the Court's advisory opinion
to enumerate every opportunity for a thorough investigation, it can set
out many of the requirements.
If these proposed interpretations were implemented at the time of
Spadafora's death, they could have thwarted any attempt of the Pana-
manian government to avoid the investigation. Panama, as a signatory
to the Convention, is under an obligation to follow rules and proce-
dures.'8 0 Under the equal protection interpretation of article 24, the
176. See American Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(1) (reviewing article 48(1) of
the American Convention).
177. See id. art. 48(1)(d) (requiring member states to permit on-site visits).
178. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 50.
179. MINNESOTA CONF. REP., supra note 52. at app. C. The conference partici-
pants put forward 17 principles in the categories of prevention, investigation, and legal
proceedings. Id. The principles address the areas of general prohibitions against arbi-
trary killing, protection of potential victims, detainee protection, the investigation
through regular investigative agencies, power to conduct the investigation, protection of
witnesses, family and public access to the report findings, commissions of inquiry, im-
munity, following the orders of superiors, and legal proceedings. Id.
180. See OAS Charter, supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing Panama as
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responsibility of Panama to investigate the death of one of its nationals
would attain international status. The Panamanian constitution explic-
itly states that the country respects international law.181
B. POSSIBLE NEGATIVE REACTIONS
A defined interpretation does not guarantee compliance by states in-
volved.1 82 States may feel that their laws adequately protect their na-
tionals, thereby eliminating the need for an international standard.1 83
The American Convention on Human Rights already allows for the
preservation of domestic laws that provide a higher level of protec-
tion.184 The Commission, however, does not accept the existence of a
domestic law with a higher standard as valid for failure to respond or
to investigate a case.
18 5
States are protective of the manner in which they conduct internal
matters. The extent to which the Commission would enforce this new
level of investigative responsibility remains to be seen. Whether the
standard would apply to only serious crimes, such as murder, or less
serious crimes as well, like a street mugging, is a question still open for
discussion. International law, although an integral part of domestic
law,188 does not dominate the domestic legal system of any state. It is
generally accepted that domestic laws adequately protect citizens of the
state. All states do not have identical laws and standards of investiga-
tion. As previously mentioned, the advisory opinion is not binding, al-
though it does have credibility, and is an interpretation of a rule or
point of law in international law adjudications.
one of the OAS member states).
181. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE PANAMA, art. 4.
182. See Lockwood, Advisory Options, supra note 171, at 250-51 (indicating that
the Court believes its advisory jurisdiction is permissive, not mandatory).
183. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (enumerating the concerns of
states over sovereign protection).
184. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 29;
see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (exemplifying the reading of one's
constitutional rights at the time of arrest as a higher standard of protection than pro-
vided in many countries).
185. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (citing a number of IACHR reso-
lutions in which the lack of state response was a factor); see also IACHR: TEN YEARS,
supra note 10, at 342-343 (stating the concern over continuing complaints of torture
and lack of state action to prevent it).
186. Krishnamurthy, supra note 168, at 25; see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.




C. BENEFITS OF THE DEFINED GUIDELINE
When a petition brought before the Commission requires an investi-
gation, a uniform standard will benefit the petitioner, the state accused
of the human rights violations, and the Commission. The expectations
outlined in an advisory opinion issued by the Court would provide a
much clearer interpretation than existing rules, resulting in a universal
benefit.
The defined interpretation would provide a greater protection for pe-
titioners who bring cases before the Commission. They will not only
have the assurance of a thorough investigation of the case at hand, but
also of those cases that are brought in the future. The standard will
survive despite any change in state government. This consistency is of
extreme importance to countries in Latin America where the change of
governments takes place frequently because government ideology con-
trols the limits of investigation.""7
The states will also benefit from the defined standard because they
will know what is expected in the answer to the inquiry. Submission of
the answer would generally fulfill the investigatory obligation. The
states may remain parties to the process if the petitioner answers the
response.188 In cases involving more than one country, the uniform in-
vestigation will provide consistency when a conflict of laws might other-
wise arise.
The establishment of standards for investigation will strengthen the
work of the Commission. As noted by the Minnesota Lawyers Interna-
tional Human Rights Committee, it is an area in the field of human
rights that is currently in the developmental stage.,89 If the Commis-
sion initiates the establishment of a standard, it would progress at the
same time as the international standard. This could influence interna-
tional as well as regional development.
CONCLUSION
This Comment focuses on the lack of an international standard of
investigative responsibility for human rights cases, a problem facing the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The case of Hugo
187. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1987 REPORT, supra note 133, at 129-32 (dis-
cussing, in part, the effects of the changes of governments on the human rights situa-
tions in Argentina); Id. at 173-77 (articulating the effects of political upheaval in Haiti
on the human rights conditions).
188. See Norris, Individual Procedure, supra note 20, at 118 (stating that the peti-
tioner or Commission may request additional action from the state).
189. See MINNESOTA CONF. REP., supra note 52, at 1.
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Spadafora exemplifies the problems with the existing standard, or lack
of a standard. The facts of the Spadafora case go beyond the standard
of state responsibility because of the indication that he died in his own
country. The Panamanian government has yet to thoroughly investigate
the death using its domestic standard of investigation.
A possible solution for the Commission is found in the existing
American Convention on Human Rights. An interpretation by the
Court of articles 24, 48(1), and 50 can provide a list of expectations
that serve the needs of both the Commission and the state accused of
violation. Using these guidelines, the Commission can develop a much
needed international standard and influence both regional and interna-
tional jurisprudence.
